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Practical sharing of quantum secrets over untrusted channels
Anne Marin and Damian Markham
CNRS LTCI, De´partement Informatique et Re´seaux, Telecom ParisTech,
23 avenue d’Italie, CS 51327, 75214 Paris CEDEX 13, France
In this work we address the issue of sharing a quantum secret over untrusted channels between the
dealer and players. Existing methods require entanglement over a number of systems which scales
with the security parameter, quickly becoming impractical. We present protocols (interactive and
a non-interactive) where single copy encodings are sufficient. Our protocols work for all quantum
secret sharing schemes and access structures, and are implementable with current experimental set
ups. For a single authorised player, our protocols act as quantum authentication protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
In secret sharing a dealer wishes to distribute a secret
to a network of players such that only authorised sets
of players can access the secret, and unauthorised sets
of players cannot. After the initial protocols for sharing
classical secrets [1, 2], ones for sharing quantum secrets
were later developed [3, 4], and have found uses including
secure multiparty computation [5]. However, these pro-
tocols rely on trusted channels between the dealer and
the players. In practice, channels may be corrupted ei-
ther by unavoidable noise, or malicious attacks.
One way to resolve this situation would be to use the
quantum authentication protocol [6]. However this pro-
tocol is highly impractical in that it uses error correcting
codes and which would require encoding each qubit sent
from the dealer into a highly entangled state (or perform
entangling measurements, which would allow the genera-
tion of large entangled states), the size of which scale with
the security parameter. This difficulty, on a par with the
coherences needed for quantum computing, renders this
approach infeasible in the near future.
In this work we present a protocol which is universal
(it works for all quantum secret sharing protocols and ac-
cess structures) and is implementable with current exper-
imental setups, for example by using graph states. This is
possible because our protocol uses only single copy encod-
ings. As in the authentication scheme [6], our protocol
uses an initial shared secret key between the dealer and
receivers. We begin by introducing an interactive pro-
tocol, which will serve as a basis for the non-interactive
protocol which follows. We then give an example of an
explicit graph state implementation for sharing a secret
between five players such that any three can access the
secret and fewer cannot. We finish with a discussion on
possible variants of the protocol including the possibility
of abort, and the merits of graph state implementations
[7–10].
II. PROTOCOLS
In quantum secret sharing, a secret |ψ〉 = α|0〉+β|1〉 is
encoded by the dealer d into some logical basis |ψL〉P =
α|0L〉P + β|1L〉P on |P | systems, and distributed to the
players P . A set of players B ⊂ P are authorised if
they can access the secret. This is equivalent to there
existing a pair of logical operators XL, ZL which are
nontrivial only over the systems B, and act over the
logical basis in the appropriate way XL|iL〉 = |i ⊕ 1L〉,
ZL|iL〉 = (−1)i|iL〉 (where ⊕ symbolises sum modulo
two) [9]. These are used by B to access the secret. A
set of players B ⊂ P are unauthorised if they can get
no information at all about the quantum secret state.
The choice of the logical basis determines the authorised
and unauthorised sets. All our protocols are built on
the existence of these schemes (which exist for all access
structures [4]), and we will use this notation in our pro-
tocols.
For our first protocol, we use a general entangled based
picture of secret sharing [9]. In this picture the dealer and
the players share an entangled EPR state
|Φ〉dP = |0〉d|0L〉P + |1〉d|1L〉P√
2
, (1)
which is then used to teleport the secret to the play-
ers. The interactive protocol presented below essentially
verifies that the dealer and a give set of authorised play-
ers B share this state (or the associated reduced state),
in which case the teleportation will be successful. More
explicitly, the dealer generates many (S) copies of the
entangled EPR state (1) and uses all but one to test the
state (steps 3. and 4 in the protocol below), and one
to teleport (step 5.). By randomly choosing when to test
and when to use the state for teleportation any malicious
actions cannot help but be detected. We will see after
that this can be translated to a non-interactive protocol
by replacing communication by a shared random key.
Interactive Protocol
1. Dealer d generates S EPR states, |Φ〉⊗SdP , and sends
the shares of each one to P .
2. After P received all their parts, d chooses r ∈
[1, ...S] at random and sends r to P .
3. For EPR pairs i 6= r, d chooses ti ∈ [0, 1] and mea-
sures Xd if ti = 0 or measures Zd if ti = 1, and
denotes the result yi, and sends ti and yi to P .
4. For EPR pairs i 6= r, accessing set B measure XL,B
if ti = 0 or measures ZL,B if ti = 1. Denoting result
by y′i if yi = y
′
i ACCEPT, if yi 6= y′i REJECT.
25. For i = r, d uses EPR pair r to teleport the secret
state onto the logical basis, denoting the bell ba-
sis measurements x, and sends x to all P . Upon
receiving x, B decodes using XL,B and ZL,B.
This protocol is effectively a quantum authentication
protocol from the dealer to authorised set B. In [6] a
framework for quantum authentication is laid out, along
with definitions of completeness, soundness and security,
which we will adopt here. A general quantum authenti-
cation scheme for sending messages from A to B is de-
scribed by a randomly chosen classical key k ∈ K that is
shared by A and B, and associated encoding operations
Ak and Bk respectively. At the end of the protocol B
has a system which encodes the message, and a classical
register which encodes the decision whether to accept or
reject in orthogonal states |ACC〉 and |REJ〉. A quan-
tum authentication scheme is ǫ-secure if for all states |ψ〉
it satisfies the two conditions.
• Completeness. For all keys k ∈ K
Bk(Ak(|ψ〉〈ψ|)) = |ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|. (2)
• Soundness. For all (possibly malicious) channels
O, describing the expected state on Bob’s side after
the protocol as ρB =
1
|K|
∑
k∈KBk(O(Ak(|ψ〉〈ψ|))),
and denoting the two projections P
|ψ〉
fail := (I −
|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|, then
Tr
(
P
|ψ〉
failρB
)
≤ ǫ. (3)
We say that our protocols are ǫ-secure if all authorised
sets B can authenticate the secret with ǫ-security, and
unauthorised sets of players get no information. The lat-
ter is guarenteed by the use of the original secret sharing
logical operators in our protocol, as is the completeness,
we will prove the soundness now.
The left hand side of equation (3) is equal to the proba-
bility of accepting multiplied by the fidelity to B’s result-
ing state (averaged over keys) to the space orthogonal to
the ideal state |ψ〉. That is, it represents a failing in the
protocol, so we want to make it arbitrarily small (with
some security parameter S). In order to prove soundness,
we will bound this by considering statements about the
entangled states themselves, before the teleportation.
We first introduce the operator ΠdB := 1/4(Id ⊗ IB +
Xd ⊗ XL,B + ZdXd ⊗ ZL,BXL,B + Zd ⊗ ZL,B), which
is a projector onto a space where all states are max-
imally entangled between d and B. More specifically
every state in this subspace can be expressed in the
form
|0〉d|0L(i)〉B+|1〉d|1L(i)〉B√
2
, where {|0L(i)〉B , |1L(i)〉B}
are some basis of B such that i represents a possible log-
ical bases, XL,B|jL(i)〉B = |j ⊕ 1L(i)〉B, ZL,B|jL(i)〉B =
(−1)j |jL(i)〉B and we will use many such bases in (4)
such that 〈jL(i)|kL(m)〉B = δj,kδi,m.
Consider the state ρrdB which is used to teleport in
protocol step 5 (conditioned on accepting on all other
pairs, see (6)). Any such state can be purified to |Ψ〉dBE ,
which can be expanded
|Ψ〉dBE = (ΠdB ⊗ IE + (IdB −ΠAB)⊗ IE))|Ψ〉dBE
=
√
F
(∑
i
αi(|0〉d|0L(i)〉B + |1〉d|1L(i)〉B)|ψi〉E
)
+
√
1− F |ξ〉dBE , (4)
where F = Tr(ΠdBρ
r
dB). If this state is then used to
teleport a state |ψ〉 from d to B, followed by B doing a
logical decoding to ancilla system B′ (for example B per-
forms a logical swap onto B′) the state recovered ρB′ has
fidelity f := 〈ψ|ρB′ |ψ〉 with the original state satisfying
f ≥ F . Furthermore,
Tr
(
P
|ψ〉
failρB
)
= Tr (((I − |ψ〉〈ψ|) ⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|)ρB)
≤ Tr (Π⊥dB ⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|ρdBAR) , (5)
where Π⊥dB is the projector onto the space orthogonal to
ΠdB and ρdBAR = 1/S
∑S
r=1 p
r
ACCρ
r
dB⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|+
prREJρ
r,REJ
dB ⊗ |REJ〉〈REJ |, prACC and prREJ are the
probability of accepting and rejecting respectively when
using r, and ρr,REJdB is the state conditioned on rejecting.
Denoting the POVM element associated to ac-
cepting the test step 4 for pair i as MACCi =
1/2
(
Idi⊗IBi+Xdi⊗XL,Bi
2 +
Idi⊗IBi+Zdi⊗ZL,Bi
2
)
, we have
MACCi ≤ (
Idi⊗IBi+Πdi,Bi)
2 . Then, if we call the total
state shared over all copies of the dealer and the players
B, ρd1,B1,...dS,BS , it follows that
ρrdB =
1
prACC
Trrc

⊗
i6=r
MACCiρd1,B1,...dS,BS

 , (6)
where Trrc indicates trace over all systems but r. Putting
this together we have,
Tr
(
Π⊥dBρdB
)
=
1
S
S∑
r=1
Tr
(
Π⊥dr,Br ⊗i6=r MACCiρd1,B1,...dS,BS
)
≤ Tr (Qρd1,B1,...dS,BS ) , (7)
where Q =
∑S
r=1Π
⊥
dr,Br
⊗i6=r (Idi⊗IBi+Πdi,Bi)2 . It can
easily be seen that Q has maximum eigenvalues of 1/S,
reached by projection Π⊥dj ,Bj ⊗i6=jΠdi,Bi for any j. With
this, we arrive at the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The interactive protocol defined above is
ǫ-secure, with scaling ǫ = 1/S.
Note here that the scaling of the protocol is inverse lin-
ear, as compared to exponential in [6]. This can be under-
stood as the cost of making the protocol practical. To get
3the exponential scaling in [6] they require entangled mea-
surements or encodings over S systems (which quickly be-
comes infeasible), whereas our protocol requires S copies
of the single round encodings, which adds no difficulty in
standard optical implementations, and is implementable
with current technology.
The protocol above suffers from two main issues.
Firstly, interaction is needed between the dealer and the
players. Although this could be allowed in principle, it is
more interesting if limited or no interaction is needed.
Second, largely due to the interaction, memory is re-
quired by the dealer and players B between steps 1 and
5. The dealer must keep their part of the EPR pairs
until the players have recieved their shares, and B must
keep their shares until r is announced by the dealer and
further until d announces their result x for the telepor-
tation. These problems can be overcome by replacing
communication and the entanglement between the dealer
and players with shared random keys, as was done in [6],
but with an extra twist - they should be shared using a
classical secret sharing protocol, so that the access struc-
ture is maintained. In this way, the protocol below re-
quires no interaction after the initial sharing of a random
key and the dealer’s use of the channel, and similarly no
memory is required by B or d and no entanglement is
needed between d and P (it is of the ‘prepare and mea-
sure’ type). To encode the randomly chosen r, we define
string q = (q1, ...qS) such that qi = 0 if i 6= r, qi = 1 if
i = r, where r is randomly chosen in [1, ..S].
Non-interactive Protocol
1. d and P share random strings q, t, y, x via a classical
secret sharing scheme over P (i.e. d knows each
string, but it is shared via a classical secret sharing
scheme with the relevant access structure over P
so that only authorised sets can access it, and only
when they collaborate to do so, and unauthorised
sets get no information at all).
2. Going through round by round i = 1...S. If qi = 0
the dealer proceeds to step 3, if qi = 1 the dealer
proceeds to step 4.
3. For qi = 0
(a) Dealer prepares and distributes state
HtiLZ
yi
L
|0L〉P+|1L〉P√
2
.
(b) After receiving the state from the dealer, au-
thorised set B collaborate to find qi (which is
0), ti, and yi.
(c) Authorised set B measures XL,B if ti = 0 or
measures ZL,B if ti = 1 . The result is denoted
y′i.
If yi 6= y′i REJECT. If yi = y′i ACCEPT.
(d) If i = S, END, otherwise return to step 2.
4. For qi = 1
(a) d encodes and distrubutes the state
Xx0L Z
x1
L |ψL〉P .
(b) After recieving the state from the dealer, au-
thorised set B collaborate to find qi (which is
1), ti, yi and x.
(c) B decodes using XL,B, ZL,B.
(d) If i = S, END, otherwise return to step 2
Replacing the communication by shared random
strings in this way does not effect the security [6, 11],
and we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The non- interactive protocol defined above
is ǫ-secure, with ǫ = 1/S.
III. EXAMPLE
In recent years graph states have emerged as a useful
framework in which to do secret sharing [7–10]. As an
example, we now illustrate how secret sharing over un-
trusted channels works for the case of five players, such
that any set of three or more players can access the secret
and any fewer have none (the so called (3, 5) threshold se-
cret sharing scheme of [7]). To begin, we introduce some
notation. A graph state |G〉1,...,n is a state on n qubits
which is associated to graph G through graph state sta-
biliser operatorsKi := Xi⊗j∈N(i)Zj where i is associated
to a vertex in the graph and N(i) are the set of its neigh-
bours, and the eigenequations Ki|G〉1,...n = |G〉1,...n ∀i.
In our example the logical states are given by |0L〉P =
|GP 〉P for the graph GP in Fig. 1a), and |1L〉P =
Z1Z2Z3Z4Z5|GP 〉P with P = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The entan-
gled state used in the interactive protocol step 1 is
|Φ〉dP = |0〉d|0L〉P + |1〉d|1L〉P√
2
. (8)
It is not difficult to see that this is itself a graph state
associated to the graph in Fig. 1b), |Φ〉dP = |GdP 〉dP .
The choice of logical operators depends on the set
B ⊂ P who are trying to access the secret. Notice that
during the protocol the dealers’ action does not require
knowledge of B - this is essential to secret sharing, so
that the players can decide for themselves who access
the secret.
If players B = {1, 2, 3} wish to act as the authorised
set, they can use logical operators XL = X1Z2X3 and
ZL = Z1X2Z3. The logical operators measured in the
test step of the protocol (step 4 for the interactive and
step 3 for the non-interactive) are graph state stabilis-
ers of the graph GdB given in Fig. 1c), Xd ⊗ XL,B =
KdK1K3, Zd ⊗ ZL,B = K2. This is no coincidence, and
is a general feature of graph state protocols, which gives
a simple decomposition of states into the graph state ba-
sis as the natural expansion for (4). To decode the secret
after teleportation, players 1 and 3 measure in the Bell
basis, and the secret is passed onto the qubit of player
2. This is the same decoding procedure for the standard
secret sharing protocol [7].
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FIG. 1: Graphs for sharing a secret amongst five players
such that any majority can access the secret [7].a)
Graph GP associated to logical encoding. b) Graph
GdP for the entangled state between d and P used in
step 1 of the protocol. c) Graph GdB associated to the
test for players B = {1, 2, 3}. d) Graph GdB associated
to the test for players B = {1, 3, 4}.
If players B = {1, 3, 4} wish to act as the authorised
set, they can use logical operators XL = Z1X3X4 and
ZL = X1X3X4. The logical operators measured in the
test step of the protocol (4 for the interactive and 3
for the non-interactive) are graph state stabilisers of the
graph GdB given in Fig. 1d), Xd ⊗ XL,B = KdK3K4,
Zd⊗ZL,B = K1K3K4. In this case, to decode the secret
after teleportation, players 3 and 4 measure in the Bell
basis, and the secret is passed onto the qubit of player 1.
Logical operators can similarly be defined for all sets
of three players, and it is easy to see that any two players
cannot access the secret by themselves [7].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Several variations of these protocols are also possible.
In particular, if the quantum secret is precious, the dealer
may not want to send the information when the channel
is not trusted - i.e. when it fails the test part of the pro-
tocols above. To address this one can adapt the protocol
to allow for the players to announce abort when they fail
the test. It is possible to show an adapted theorem for
security, which is only slightly modified. We present the
protocol and the theorem in the appendix A. One sub-
tle issue with how this may be used however, is that the
protocol is now interactive (albeit limited to when the
players announce abort). When the accessing set B an-
nounce abort they declare themselves, which may be an
issue in some uses of secret sharing as a primitive (one
may try to develop ways to overcome this for example
using an anonymous announcement of abort). Another
alternative protocol with abort can be found if, instead
of randomly choosing in a fixed number (S) of rounds, at
each round we randomly choose to test or use the chan-
nel. This allows for slightly different security statements,
as used in [12] for entanglement verification. We consider
this simplified unbounded aborting protocol in appendix
A.
Using graph state schemes as in the example shown
here has several advantages. Firstly they are a com-
mon framework for many quantum information process-
ing tasks, including measurement based quantum compu-
tation and error correction. This allows these protocols
to naturally fit into more general and elaborate network
scenarios integrating several of these tasks. Furthermore,
this relationship allows us to understand the connection
between different protocols. The measurements used for
the test part of our protocol are exactly those used for the
CQ protocols to establish secure key between the dealer
and authorised players [9]. This relationship is general
- whenever complementary bases are used to establish a
secure key, successful key generation implies the channel
works [9, 13].
Secondly graph states are very well suited to imple-
mentation. Many schemes exist for the generation and
manipulation of graph states in different technologies in-
cluding linear optics [14], continuous variables [15, 16]
and ion traps [22, 23]. Optical implementations of graph
states are ideal for the secret sharing protocols presented
here, and experiments in this direction are well advanced,
indeed optics has been used to implement sophisticated
quantum information processing tasks including mea-
surement based quantum computing [17], blind quantum
computation [18], and error correction [19]. These exper-
iments contain all the key steps needed for our protocols.
All of the results here easily extend to the qudit case,
including use for qudit graph state secret sharing [8, 9],
which allows our scheme to be used to cover all access
structures. One simply extends the states and operators
to their natural qudit versions. This is done explicitly
in the appendix B. Furthermore, the proofs also follow
through for secret sharing protocols using mixed state en-
codings, as well as the hybrid protocols of [20],[21] where
classical secret sharing is used in addition to allow for ac-
cess structures otherwise forbidden, in this case however
authenticated classical channels between the dealer and
the players must also be secure.
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Appendix A: Aborting protocols
We first present an adaptation of the non-interactive
protocol to include abort.
Protocol with Abort
1. d and P share random strings q, t, y, x via a classical
secret sharing scheme over P.
2. Going through round by round i = 1...S. Autho-
rised set B collaborate to find qi. If qi = 0 all
proceed to step 3, if qi = 1 all proceed to step 4.
3. For qi = 0
(a) Dealer prepares and distributes state
HtiLZ
yi
L
|0L〉P+|1L〉P√
2
.
(b) For authorised set B, if ti = 0, B measures
ZL, if ti = 1, B measures XL. The result is
denoted y′i.
If yi 6= y′i B announces ABORT, all abort.
(c) If yi = y
′
i ACCEPT, and return to step 2.
4. For qi = 1
(a) d encodes and distributes the state
Xx0L Z
x1
L |ψL〉P .
(b) B decode.
(c) END
Theorem 3. The aborting protocol defined above is ǫ-
secure, with ǫ < 2/S.
The proof follows the same argumentation as before,
but in this case the testing stops at round r. This gives
a different Q operator (applied as in equation (7)),
Q =
1
S
S∑
r=1
Π⊥dr ,Br
⊗
i<r
(Idi ⊗ IBi +Πdi,Bi)
2
⊗
i>r
(Idi⊗IBi).
(A1)
To find the greatest eigenvalue we can decompose into
the {Πdi,Bi ,Π⊥di,Bi} basis. Then we have a sum with all
strings of products, where each string x, in which Πdi,Bi
appears |x| times, occurs with weight 1/S∑|x|−1a=0 1/2a.
Thus, the greatest eigenvalue of Q is 1/S
∑S−1
a=0 1/2
a =
2−2−S
S < 2/S, given by the string Π
⊥
d1,B1
⊗ Π⊥d2,B2 ⊗
...Π⊥dS ,BS . In this case we see that the optimal cheat (in
terms of maximising the failure of the protocol) is given
by the dishonest parties preparing many copies of states
all outside the ideal space.
We also present an aborting protocol where the
randomness (over whether to test the channel or use it)
is inserted each round.
Aborting protocol, indefinite length
1. Dealer d generates EPR state |Φ〉dP and sends the
shares to P .
2. After P received all their parts, d chooses r ∈
[0, ...S − 1] at random and sends r to P . If r 6= 0,
continue to step 3, otherwise move to step 4.
3. TEST
(a) d chooses t ∈ {0, 1}. If t = 0, d measures Zd,
if t = 1 d measures Xd. The result is denoted
y. d sends t and y to P .
6(b) If t = 0, B measures ZL,B, if t = 1, B mea-
sures XL,B. The result is denoted y
′. If
yi 6= y′i B announces ABORT, all abort.
(c) If yi = y
′
i ACCEPT, and return to step 1.
4. USE CHANNEL
(a) d uses EPR pair to teleport the secret state
onto the logical basis, denoting the bell basis
measurements x, and sends x to all P . Upon
receiving x, B decodes.
This protocol is similar to the use of the verification of
GHZ states in [12], and we can present a similar security
statement as there. Let Cf be the event that the state is
teleported, and that the fidelity of any teleported state ρ
and the sent state |ψ〉 is bounded by 〈ψ|ρ|ψ〉 ≤ f , then
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For all f, the probability of event Cf is
bounded
P (Cf )) ≤ 2
S(1− f) . (A2)
To prove this, call CNf the event that at round N + 1
the state is used (which means that all previous rounds
have returned accept) and that the fidelity of all states
sent satisfies 〈ψ|ρ|ψ〉 ≤ f . The probability of this event
is given by the probability of using the N + 1th round
state, times the probability of having tested the previous
rounds times the probability of passing all the previous
rounds.
P (CNf ) =
1
S
(
1− 1
S
)N N∏
i=1
pi (A3)
where pi is the probability that round i is accepted. This
is given by
pi = Tr(ρdi,BiMACCi)
≤ 1 + Tr(ρdi,BiΠdi,Bi)
2
≤ 1 + f
2
. (A4)
The probability of event Cf is then given by taking the
limit of the sum over N , which is bounded by taking the
integral.
P (CF ) ≤ 1
S
∞∑
0
(
1− 1
S
)N (
1 + f
2
)N
≤ 1
S
∫ ∞
N=0
(
1−
(
1− f
2
))N
dN
=
1
S
−1
log
(
1−
(
1−f
2
))
≤ 2
S(1− f) . (A5)
Appendix B: Qudit protocols
The qudit versions work in the same way, by simply
replacing states and operators by their generalised high
dimensional versions. For simplicity we consider prime
dimension q (this is sufficient for allowing for all access
structures [6]). Paulis and the computational basis are
replaced by their qudit extensions, X , Z, X |i〉 = |i ⊕ 1〉
(where now ⊕ denotes sum modulo q) and Z|i〉 = ωi|i〉,
ω = ei2pi/q (analogously for all the possible sets of logical
operators and basis states), and the EPR state by its
qudit version
|Φ〉dP = 1√
q
q−1∑
i=0
|i〉d|iL〉P . (B1)
We similarly define the projection operator on d and
subset of players B ⊂ P ,
ΠdB =
∑
t∈F 2q
Zt
1
d X
t2
d ⊗ Zt
1
L,BX
t2
L,B, (B2)
where t = {t1, t2}, ti ∈ Fq. This again defines a space
of maximally entangled states between the dealer and
players B.
For simplicity we present a qudit protocol which in-
cludes all the measurements in this projection. This is
not necessary for our results, indeed for the qubit case
we had fewer and similar results follow using fewer mea-
surements as in the qubit version - it is mostly a matter
of taste if one chooses the full set or fewer (similar to the
situation for qudit versions of QKD [24]). We adopt it
here for its simpler presentation. It allows for analagous
statement of Theorems 1, 2 following the same logic as
for the qubit version.
Interactive Protocol (qudit)
1. Dealer d generates S qudit EPR states, |Φ〉⊗SdP , and
sends the shares of each one to P .
2. After P received all their parts, d chooses r ∈
[1, ...S] at random and sends r to P .
3. For qudit EPR pairs i 6= r, d chooses ti ∈ F 2q , and
measures Z
t1i
d X
t2i
d , and denotes the result yi, and
sends ti and yi to P .
4. For qudit EPR pairs i 6= r, accessing set B mea-
sure Z
t1i
L,BX
t2i
L,B . Denoting result by y
′
i if yi = y
′
i
ACCEPT, if yi 6= y′i REJECT.
5. For i = r, d uses qudit EPR pair r to teleport
the secret state onto the logical basis, denoting the
qudit bell basis measurements x, and sends x to all
P . Upon receiving x, B decodes.
Theorem 5. Any state ρdB with fidelity F =
Tr(ΠdBρdB) to projector ΠdB accepts at step 4 of the
qudit interactive protocol with probability Pr =
1 + F
2
.
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is ǫ-secure, with ǫ = 1/S.
The non-interactive version follows similarly, as does
the Theorem. The state |Ψt,y〉P denotes the eigenstate
of the operator Z
t1i
L X
t2i
L with eigenvalue ω
y.
Non-interactive Protocol (qudit)
1. d and P share random strings r, t, y, x via a classi-
cal secret sharing scheme over P (i.e. d knows the
string, but it is shared via a classical secret sharing
scheme with the relevant access structure over P
so that only authorised sets can access it, and only
when they collaborate to do so, and unauthorised
sets get no information at all).
2. Going through round by round i = 1...S. If qi = 0
the dealer proceeds to step 3, if qi = 1 the dealer
proceeds to step 4.
3. For qi = 0
(a) Dealer prepares and distributes state |Ψt,y〉P .
(b) After receiving the state from the dealer, au-
thorised set B collaborate to find qi (which is
0), ti and yi.
(c) Authorised set B measures Z
t1i
L,BX
t2i
L,B . The
result is denoted y′i.
If yi 6= y′i REJECT. If yi = y′i ACCEPT.
(d) If i = S, END, otherwise return to step 2.
4. For qi = 1
(a) d encodes and distrubutes the state
Xx0L Z
x1
L |ψL〉P .
(b) After recieving the state from the dealer, au-
thorised set B collaborate to find qi, which is
1.
(c) B decodes.
(d) If i = S, END, otherwise return to step 2
Theorem 7. The non-interactive qudit protocol defined
above is ǫ-secure, with ǫ = 1/S.
The aborting protocol follows similarly.
